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Recently, Choi et al. proposed an assumption on Mayers-Lo-Chau (MLC) no-go theorem that8
the state of the entire quantum system is invariable to both participants before the unveiling phase.9
This means that the theorem is only applicable to static quantum bit commitment (QBC). This10
paper find that the assumption is unnecessary and the MLC no-go theorem can be applied to not11
only static QBC, but also non-static one. A non-static QBC protocol proposed by Choi et al. is12
briefly reviewed and analyzed to work as a supporting example. In addition, a novel way to prove13
the impossibility of the two kinds of QBC is given.14
PACS numbers: 03.67.Dd15
I. INTRODUCTION16
Bit commitment allows a sender (Alice) to commit a17
bit b ∈ {0, 1} to a receiver (Bob) in the following way:18
1) Alice can not change the value of the committed bit19
after the commitment phase (binding property); 2) Bob20
can not obtain the value of the committed bit before the21
unveiling phase (concealing property). Bit commitment22
is an important cryptographic primitive and can be used23
as a building block for some other cryptographic proto-24
cols, such as coin flipping [1], oblivious transfer [2], zero-25
knowledge proof [3], and multiparty computation [4].26
A secure bit commitment protocol should satisfy the27
binding property and the concealing property at the same28
time. However, unconditionally secure classical bit com-29
mitment protocols do not exist. There are only some un-30
conditionally binding and computationally concealing bit31
commitment protocols [5] or unconditionally concealing32
and computationally binding bit commitment ones [6].33
Since unconditionally secure quantum key distribution34
protocols were proposed in [7–9], some quantum bit com-35
mitment (QBC) protocols have been proposed with the36
hope that QBC can provide unconditional security [10–37
12]. The most famous one is the bit commitment protocol38
proposed by Brassard et al. in [11], which was claimed39
to be unconditionally secure. Unfortunately, the protocol40
was showed to be insecure afterwards [13]. Furthermore,41
Mayers, Lo and Chau proved that general secure QBC42
protocols are impossible [14, 15], which is called MLC43
no-go theorem.44
Although discovery of the MLC no-go theorem de-45
pressed much study on QBC protocols, researchers try46
to design secure QBC by adopting certain restrictions47
or weakening some security requirements. For instance,48
Kent proposed two bit commitment protocols based on49
special relativity theory [16, 17]; Damgard et al. designed50
∗ liqin805@163.com
a secure QBC protocol in a bounded quantum-storage51
model [18]; Hardy and Kent gave a secure cheat sensitive52
QBC protocol ensuring that if either a committer or a53
committee cheat, the other can detect it with a nonzero54
probability [19]. Besides these, secure QBC protocols are55
implemented in a noisy-storage model under the assump-56
tion that the dishonest party can not access large-scale57
reliable quantum storage [20].58
Recently, Choi et al. proposed a secure non-static QBC59
protocol with help of a trusted third party (TTP) [21]60
and pointed out that the MLC no-go theorem is based61
on an assumption that the whole quantum state is static62
before Alice reveals the committed bit. That is to say,63
the MLC no-go theorem was thought to be adapted to64
static QBC only. D’Ariano et al. also hold this opinion65
and gave another strengthened and explicit proof involv-66
ing impossibility of some non-static QBC protocols [22].67
However, we find that the assumption given by Choi et68
al. in [21] is unnecessary and non-static QBC is also im-69
possible just due to the MLC no-go theorem. Although70
Choi et al. proposed a secure non-static QBC protocol by71
adopting a TTP [21], the protocol is still different from a72
general two-party QBC protocol and is somewhat similar73
to a quantum secret sharing protocol. Interestingly, the74
non-static QBC protocol without the TTP can just serve75
as an example to show that the MLC no-go theorem can76
be applied to non-static QBC also. In addition, we prove77
the impossibility of the two kinds of QBC in a different78
way: prove any binding QBC protocols is not concealing,79
while the related proofs proposed in [14, 15, 21, 22] show80
any concealing protocols are not binding.81
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In the82
next section, it will be shown that the assumption of the83
MLC no-go theorem given by Choi et al. is unnecessary84
and the MLC no-go theorem can be adapted to both85
static QBC and non-static QBC. The non-static QBC86
protocol proposed by Choi et al. is reviewed and analyzed87
in Sec. III. Then the impossibility of QBC is proved in88
Sec. IV in a different way. The last section concludes the89
paper.90
2II. APPLICABILITY OF THE MLC NO-GO91
THEOREM TO NON-STATIC QBC92
In [14, 15], the MLC no-go theorem was proved in the
following basic idea. Suppose the initial states of Alice
and Bob are |b〉A (b ∈ {0, 1}) and |ϕ〉B , respectively, and
let UAB denote all the algorithms that Alice and Bob
may implement. Then the final quantum state shared by
Alice and Bob is |φb〉AB = UAB(|b〉A ⊗ |ϕ〉B). If a QBC
protocol is perfectly concealing, namely
ρB0 = TrA(|φ0〉AB〈φ0|) = TrA(|φ1〉AB〈φ1|) = ρB1 ,
then there exists a local unitary transformation SA sat-
isfying
(SA ⊗ I)UAB(|b〉A ⊗ |ϕ〉B) = UAB(|1− b〉A ⊗ |ϕ〉B)
according to Gisin-Hughston-Jozsa-Wootters theorem93
given in [23, 24]. So, by postponing measurements and94
implementing local unitary operations, Alice can change95
the value of the committed bit arbitrarily without be-96
ing discovered by Bob. If the QBC protocol is supposed97
to be unconditionally concealing, similar results can be98
derived also.99
However, Choi et al. observed that the local unitary100
operation SA performed by Alice is related to Bob’s ini-101
tial state |ϕ〉B [21]. If |ϕ〉B is random and unknown to102
Alice, she can not find a suitable local unitary operation103
to change the committed value. Thus, a necessary as-104
sumption of the MLC no-go theorem is that the state of105
quantum system should be static to both participants.106
This means the MLC no-go theorem was considered to107
be applicable to static QBC only.108
As shown above, the proof of the MLC no-go theorem109
is based on the following strategy: a QBC protocol is110
first supposed unconditionally concealing and it is then111
proved that unconditionally binding is impossible. So,112
Theorem 1 can be obtained, which means that the as-113
sumption of the MLC no-go theorem suggested by Choi114
et al. is unnecessary.115
Theorem 1 The MLC no-go theorem is also applied to116
non-static QBC.117
Proof : Assume |ϕ〉B is random and unknown to Al-118
ice. Let UAB =
∑
ijkl aijkl|i〉A|j〉BA〈k|B〈l| and |ϕ〉B =119∑
m cm|m〉B, then we have120
|φb〉AB = UAB(|b〉A ⊗ |ϕ〉B)121
=
∑
ijkl
aijkl|i〉A|j〉BA〈k|B〈l|
(∑
m
cm|b〉A|m〉B
)
122
=
∑
ijl
aijblcl|i〉A|j〉B ,123
and124
ρBb = TrA(|φb〉AB〈φb|)125
= TrA

∑
ijl
aijblcl|i〉A|j〉B
∑
pqr
a∗pqbrc
∗
rA〈p|B〈q|


126
=
∑
ijlqr
aijbla
∗
iqbrclc
∗
r |j〉B〈q|.127
Suppose a non-static QBC protocol is perfectly con-128
cealing, then ρB0 and ρ
B
1 should be identical for any129
|ϕ〉B =
∑
m cm|m〉B, i.e.130
ρB0 =
∑
ijlqr
aij0la
∗
iq0rclc
∗
r |j〉B〈q|131
=
∑
ijlqr
aij1la
∗
iq1rclc
∗
r |j〉B〈q|132
= ρB1 .133
Since the above formula always holds for any |ϕ〉B , we134
have135
aij0la
∗
iq0r = aij1la
∗
iq1r. (1)136
Let SA =
∑
xy
sxy|x〉A〈y|, where


sxy = 0, if x 6= y,
sxx = 0, if axq1r = 0 for any q and r,
sxx =
a∗xq0r
a∗xq1r
, otherwise.
Equation (1) makes SA always satisfy137
(SA ⊗ IB)|φ0〉AB =
(∑
xy
sxy|x〉A〈y| ⊗
∑
k
|k〉B〈k|
)
138

∑
ijl
aij0lcl|i〉A|j〉B


139
=
∑
ijl
aij0lcl
∑
x
sxi|x〉A|j〉B140
=
∑
ijl
aij1lcl|i〉A|j〉B141
= |φ1〉AB,142
for any |ϕ〉B . Thus the non-static QBC protocol is not143
binding. If assume it is unconditionally concealing, sim-144
ilar results can be obtained also. 145
III. REVIEW AND ANALYSIS OF CHOI ET146
AL.’S NON-STATIC QBC PROTOCOL147
In [21], Choi et al. proposed an unconditionally secure148
non-static QBC protocol with aid of a TTP. We briefly149
reviewed it in the following four phases and then show its150
simplified version can serve as an example demonstrating151
the MLC no-go theorem is applicable to non-static QBC.152
3a. Preparing phase : First, Alice and TTP share
N maximally entangled states in the form |ψ−〉AT =
|01>−|10>√
2
. This kind of entangled state has a special
property, namely equation
|ψ−〉AT = (U ⊗ U)|ψ−〉AT
holds up to the global phase for any unitary transforma-
tion U . Then, TTP applies random projection measure-
ments represented as
Mi = {|fi〉T 〈fi|, |f⊥i 〉T 〈f⊥i |}
to its qubit of each entangled state |ψ−〉AT for i = 1 ∼ N .153
If the measurement outcome of TTP is |fi〉(|f⊥i 〉), then154
Alice’s measurement result should be |ψi〉A = |f⊥i 〉(|fi〉).155
But TTP does not announce Mi now, so Alice can not156
know the result |ψi〉A.157
b. Commitment phase : To committee the bit158
b, Alice applies the corresponding operations Pi ∈159
{M,N, J,K}, where160
M =
(
1 0
0 1
)
, N =
(
0 −1
1 0
)
,161
J =
1√
2
(
1 i
1 −i
)
,K =
1√
2
(
1 i
−1 i
)
.162
If Alice chooses to commit b = 0, she randomly sends
M |ψi〉A or N |ψi〉A to Bob. Otherwise, she sends J |ψi〉A
or K|ψi〉A instead with the same probability. To guaran-
tee the randomness, Alice introduces an auxiliary system
A′ whose initial state is |+〉A′ = |0〉A′+|1〉A′√
2
. Then the
state of the whole system A′A is |+〉|ψi〉. If b = 0, Alice
applies |0〉A′〈0| ⊗M + |1〉A′〈1| ⊗N to A′A to obtain
|ϕ0〉A′A = |0〉A
′ ⊗M |ψi〉A + |1〉A′ ⊗N |ψi〉A√
2
.
Otherwise, she implements |0〉A′〈0|⊗J + |1〉A′〈1|⊗K on
A′A and gets
|ϕ1〉A′A = |0〉A
′ ⊗ J |ψi〉A + |1〉A′ ⊗K|ψi〉A√
2
.
Due to the randomness of |ψi〉A, the resulting state163
|ϕb〉A′A is also different, thus Alice cannot control the164
relationship between |ϕ0〉A′A and |ϕ1〉A′A without know-165
ing the exact state |ψi〉A.166
c. Sustaining phase : In this phase, both Alice and167
Bob do nothing.168
d. Revealing phase : Alice unveils all Pi’s, and then169
TTP opens all Mi’s and the corresponding measurement170
outcomes. After knowing all the information, Bob mea-171
sures P †i Pi|ψi〉 with Mi and compares all the measure-172
ment results with those TTP announced. If all the mea-173
surement outcomes are opposite, Alice is honest and the174
committed value has not been changed; otherwise Alice175
is dishonest.176
In [21], Choi et al. claimed that the protocol is un-
conditionally secure. However, the usage of TTP makes
the above non-static QBC protocol do not correspond to
the fact that only two parties is involved in a general
QBC protocol, although TTP plays a little role in offer-
ing quantum sources and is not involved in communica-
tion between two parties directly. In a way, the protocol
is more like a quantum secret sharing protocol. For in-
stance, the cooperation between Bob and TTP can get
Aice’s committed value while one of them cannot. If the
actions implemented by TTP are replaced by Bob, the
protocol will not be secure. As shown by Choi et al. in
[21], if the non-static QBC protocol without a TTP is
perfectly concealing, a local unitary operator
SA =
(
a b
c d
)
such that J = aM + bN and K = cM + dN , can be177
used to freely change the committed bit. Thus it can be178
seen that Choi et al.’s non-static QBC protocol without179
a TTP can serve as a specific example to demonstrate180
that the MLC no-go theorem is applicable to non-static181
QBC also.182
IV. PROOF OF IMPOSSIBILITY OF QBC BY183
ANOTHER WAY184
Although non-static QBC between two participants is185
also impossible due to the MLC no-go theorem, it pro-186
vides us another way to prove the impossibility of both187
non-static and static QBC.188
Let us show the case on non-static QBC first. Premise189
of the proof of the MLC no-go theorem is that the QBC190
protocol is supposed to be perfectly concealing,191
F (ρB0 , ρ
B
1 ) = 1, (2)192
or unconditionally concealing,
F (ρB0 , ρ
B
1 ) = 1− δ,
where δ > 0.193
For non-static QBC protocols, different initial states194
|ϕ〉B may lead to different ρBb , so the value of F (ρB0 , ρB1 )195
may vary and it is difficult to make the concealing prop-196
erty be satisfied. On the other hand, since |ϕ〉B is totally197
random and unknown to Alice, it is difficult for Alice to198
find an appropriate local unitary operator SA such that199
F ((SA ⊗ I)UAB(|b〉A ⊗ |ϕ〉B), UAB(|1− b〉 ⊗ |ϕ〉B)) = 1
(3)200
or
F ((SA⊗I)UAB(|b〉A⊗|ϕ〉B), UAB(|1−b〉⊗|ϕ〉B)) = 1−δ
is satisfied for all |ϕ〉B .201
Thus, it is better to suppose a non-static QBC protocol202
is perfectly or unconditionally binding and then prove it203
cannot be perfectly or unconditionally concealing.204
4Assume a non-static QBC protocol is perfectly binding,
i.e., there does not exist a local unitary operator SA such
that Eq. (3) holds for any |ϕ〉B. Then there must be
some |ϕ〉B such that
ρB0 = TrA(|φ0〉AB〈φ0|) 6= TrA(|φ1〉AB〈φ1|) = ρB1 .
Otherwise, the assumption violates the MLC no-go theo-205
rem. In other words, if Eq. (2) holds for any |ϕ〉B, Alice206
can find a local unitary operation SA to freely change207
the committed bit according to the MLC no-go theorem.208
Thus Bob can choose such |ϕ〉B to get some information209
of Alice’s committed bit and the non-static QBC is not210
perfectly concealing. If a non-static QBC protocol is as-211
sumed to be unconditionally binding, similar conclusions212
can be made.213
This new approach also can be used to prove impossi-
bility of static QBC. Given a fixed |ϕ〉B , if a static QBC
protocol is supposed to be perfectly binding, then there
is no local unitary operator SA satisfying Eq. (3). Ac-
cording to the Uhlmann’s theorem in [25], we can find
|φ〉, a purification of ρB0 , such that
F (ρB0 , ρ
B
1 ) = |〈φ|φ1〉|,
where |φ1〉 = UAB(|1〉A ⊗ |ϕ〉B) is a purification of
ρB1 . Between two purifications of ρ
B
0 , |φ〉 and |φ0〉 =
UAB(|0〉A ⊗ |ϕ〉B), there always exist a local unitary op-
erator SA such that (SA ⊗ I)|φ0〉 = |φ〉. Besides, from
the assumption, we know that there does not exist a local
unitary operator SA such that (SA⊗ I)|φ0〉 = |φ1〉. Thus
|φ〉 cannot be equal to |φ1〉 and
F (ρB0 , ρ
B
1 ) = |〈φ|φ1〉| 6= 1,
which means the static QBC protocol is not perfectly214
concealing. If assume a static QBC protocol is uncondi-215
tionally binding, we can prove it is not unconditionally216
concealing employing the similar method.217
V. CONCLUSION218
In this paper, we show the assumption given by Choi219
et al. on the MLC no-go theorem in [21], that the en-220
tire quantum state should be static to both participants221
before the unveiling phase, is unnecessary, and the MLC222
no-go theorem can be applied to both static QBC and223
non-static QBC. In addition, a secure non-static QBC224
protocol proposed by Choi et al. in [21] is found more225
like to a quantum secret sharing protocol, instead of a226
general two-party QBC protocol. Just inspired by the227
non-static QBC, we prove the impossibility of QBC in228
another way: suppose a QBC protocol is binding first,229
then show it is not concealing. Now, we can say that230
the MLC no-go theorem lets any two-party QBC pro-231
tocol satisfying concealing property is not binding and232
the novel proof for the impossibility of QBC given by233
us makes any two-party QBC protocol satisfying binding234
property is not concealing. In all, any two-party QBC235
protocol, no matter static or non-static, is not secure.236
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